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Houston, TX
I. The Availability of Class Actions under the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure'
In 1997, the Louisiana Legislature enacted a comprehensive revi-
sion of the class action procedure, both expanding and contracting the
availability of the device. See La. Acts 1997, No. 839, amending former
La. Code Civ. Proc. arts. 591 to 594 and 596, and repealing former La.
Code Civ. Proc. art. 593.1. The revision confirmed some of the previous
requirements for maintenance of a class action, added an additional re-
quirement, and adopted four specific types of class actions. The legisla-
tion also provided detailed rules for the prosecution and the compromise
of a class action, for some of the important "side effects" of a class ac-
tion such as attorney fees, and for the interruption of prescription as to
the claims of members of a class or a putative class.
Under the 1997 legislation, a class action may be maintained only
if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is imprac-
ticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
3. the claims or defenses of the representatives of the class are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
4. the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class; and
5. the class may be defined "objectively in terms of ascertainable
criteria, such that the court may determine the constituency of
the class for the purposes of the conclusiveness of any judg-
ment that may be rendered."
The 1997 legislation requires a prompt determination of whether the
class action meets the requirements discussed above. The proponent of
the class must file a motion to certify within ninety days after service on
all adverse parties of the initial pleading seeking class action relief. If the
proponent fails to do so, an adverse party may seek to have the class ac-
I The authors extend their appreciation to Kathryn S. Bloomfield for her contribu-
tions to this article.
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tion stricken. The court must conduct a contradictory certification hear-
ing "as soon as practicable;" however, the parties must be given a "rea-
sonable opportunity to obtain discovery on class certification issues."2
II. The Use of Class Actions in Oil and Gas Matters in Louisiana
Prior to the Passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
One commetator has described the various uses of class actions in
oilfield litigation as including: (1) fraudulent inducement in drilling fraud
and partnership cases; (2) stock fraud and (3) royalty cases.3 A brief sur-
vey of reported cases seeking class action status under the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure reveals class actions that have been pursued in-
volving royalty disputes, securities related to energy investments, well
blow outs, and refinery explosions.
However, even before the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act
discussed below, the use of class actions in royalty litigation hit a major
stumbling block in Louisiana. Under the Fifth Circuit decision in Chev-
ron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish School Bd., 377 F.3d 459 (51 Cir.
(La.) 2004), certification of a large class is unlikely in a state or federal
court in Louisiana, because each class member individually has to com-
ply with the notice requirements of La. R.S. 31:137. Chevron, 377 F.3d
459. La. R.S. 31: 137 provides:
If a mineral lessor seeks relief for the failure of his lessee to make
timely or proper payment of royalties, he must give his lessee writ-
ten notice of such failure as a prerequisite to a judicial demand for
damages or dissolution of the lease.
After the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to accept certification of
the question of the efficacy of a class royalty demand under Louisiana
La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 592A; see also Martello v. City of Ferriday, 2004-90 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 11/3/04), 186 So.2d 645.
McArthur, The Class Action Tool in Oil Field Litigation, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 113
(1996).
Lailhengue v. Mobil Oil Co., 657 So.2d 542 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/7/95) (class action
!;ought relating to explosion and fire at refinery); Duhe v. Texaco, Inc., 779 So.2d 1070
(La. App. 3d Cir. 2/7/)1) (class certification in royalty owners' action for underpayment
of royalties); Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Production Co., Inc., 698 So.2d 1001 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1997) (class action seeking royalties on gas purchaser's settlement payment
to lessee on take-or-pay purchase contracts); Andry v. Murphy Oil, USA, Inc., 710 So.2d
1126 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997) (class action arising out of fire, explosion, and emissions at
oil refinery); Ford v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 703 So.2d 542 (La. 1996) (atteipted class
action related to continuous emissions from plant); Rivera v. United Gai Pipeline Co.,
613 So.2d 1152 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993) (class action related to release of natural gas
when pipeline was being worked on by pipeline company); McCastle v. Rollins, 456
So.2d 612 (La. 1984) (class action against operator of chemical waste disposal site for
release of odors and fumes); Wilson v. Palmer Petroleum, Inc., 706 So.2d 142 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1998) (class aiction by mineral lessors against lessees for royalties); Singleton v.
Northfield Ins. Co., 826 So.2d 55 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (class action relating to well
blowout).
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Mineral Code article 137, the Fifth Circuit held that the written notice
mineral lessors are required to give mineral lessees prior to filing a law-
suit for improper payment of royalties cannot be made on behalf of a
class.
The issue certified was whether the notice given in this case by
counsel for a lessor on behalf of the putative class satisfied Articles 137-
141 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, which requires the lessor to give
written notice of the lessee's failure to make timely or proper payment of
royalties as a prerequisite to a judicial demand for damages or dissolu-
tion of the lease. The Fifth Circuit concluded that notice given by coun-
sel for a lessor on behalf of a putative class does not satisfy the require-
ments of Articles 137-141. Chevron, 377 F.3d at 463-64. The Fifth Cir-
cuit reasoned that permitting class notice, particularly in a case such as
this, upsets the careful balance established by Articles 137-141 of the
Mineral Code, which provides an incentive to lessees to promptly pay
royalties, while giving the lessee a reasonable way to avoid the harsh
remedy of lease cancellation.
Chevron thus stands for the proposition that a class action is im-
proper if each class member first has not sent an individual article 137
notice. What Chevron does not address is whether class certification
would be proper were the requisite individual notices duly made. None-
theless, under Chevron, class certification remains unlikely because the
Fifth Circuit found that there can be no class-wide article 137 notice,
thus, intimating that the class vehicle is not available due to the individu-
alized nature of articles 137, et seq. In other words, if class notice is im-
proper under the Mineral Code prior to suit, class notice should remain
improper after a lawsuit is filed even if individual notices are sent. How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit did not address or resolve that issue.
III. Introduction to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
On February 18, 2005, after years of Congressional efforts to over-
haul the treatment of class action lawsuits, President George W. Bush
signed into law the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"). CAFA
accomplishes three sweeping changes: (1) expands federal diversity ju-
risdiction over class action lawsuits through an amendment to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d), (2) relaxes restrictions on the removal to federal court of class
action lawsuits through the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1453, and (3) estab-
lishes a set of guidelines to protect class members, including a "con-
sumer class action bill of rights," through the enactment of 28 U.S.C. §§
1711-1715.
To the dismay of courts and practitioners, CAFA has proven diffi-
cult to interpret and apply in its two-year life. One court has described
CAFA as "a statute in which some major terms are left undefined, certain
of the provisions of which have been aptly characterized as 'bewildering'
or 'clumsily crafted,' and whose legislative history is, in part, of ques-
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tionable interpretative value. In short, it is a statute that is a headache to
construe."5
Nonetheless, the courts have begun to fill in the gaps left by CAFA
and have reached a consensus on some issues. While CAFA has not yet
been applied to an oil and gas class action in a published decision, CAFA
would apply to such a class action as it would to any other class action.6
This paper discusses the specific provisions of CAFA, their effect on
class action litigation, and the peculiar interpretative difficulties CAFA
presents to courts and practitioners.
IV. CAFA Expands Federal Diversity Jurisdiction over Class Action
Lawsuits.
CAFA's first, and most noteworthy, effect is its expansion of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction. Under CAFA, federal courts now have juris-
diction over class actions (1) with 100 or more class members8 (2) in
which more than S5 million is in controversy, after all class members'
claims are aggregated,9 and (3) in which any member of the plaintiff
class is a citizen of a state different from that of any defendant or in
which any membe: of the plaintiff class (or any defendant) is a foreign
state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.' 0
CAFA's scheme for diversity jurisdiction in the class action context
introduces two dramatic changes. First, CAFA does not require "com-
plete diversity" (i.e., no defendant can be a citizen of the same state as
any plaintiff), as iE the norm in federal law." In place of "complete di-
versity," CAFA requires only "balanced diversity," which is satisfied as
long as any member of the class is a citizen of a state different from any
defendant.12 Second, CAFA does not require any individual plaintiff to
Lao v. Wickes Fu-niture Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
6 The applicability of CAFA did arise in at least one oil and gas lawsuit, but the dis-
trict court determined tiat the lawsuit in question commenced prior to the effective date
of CAFA, rendering CAFA inapplicable. See Weber v. Mobil Oil Co., 2006 WL 2045875,
at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 20, 2006). Several cases analyzing CAFA have been litigated in
Louisiana, most of which are related to the flurry of litigation generated by Hurricane
Katrina.
7 For additional analysis of CAFA, see Howard S. Suskin, et al., Class Action Fair-
ness Act, 750 PLL/LIT 229 (Nov. 2006); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Fairness
Act: One Year Later, 744 PLI/LIT 67 (July 2006); Ronnie M. Schmelz, The Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005: An Overview of CAFA and the Early Decisions, 744 PLI/LIT 33
(July 2006); Robin Miller, Construction and Application of Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 2005 A.L.R. Fed: 2d 2 (2005). Each of these articles provide excellent analysis of
CAFA and each was an important source for this paper.
8 28 U.S.C.A. § 132.2(d)(5)(B).
9 Id § 1332(d)(2), (d)(6).
10 Id § 1332(d)(2).
" Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990).
12 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2)(A). "Balanced diversity" also occurs where (1) any
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meet the federal amount-in-controversy requirement of $75,000 and. in-
stead, provides that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met if the
claims of all members of the proposed class, when aggregated, exceeds
$5 million.'3
A. Amount in controversy.
Of the basic jurisdictional requirements under CAFA, only the
amount in controversy requirement has generated significant litigation.
The plaintiff has the right to plead its claim in any manner that avoids
federal subject matter jurisdiction, subject to a broad good faith require-
ment with respect to the amount in controversy.14 "Good faith in this
context is entwined with the 'legal certainty' test, so that a defendant will
be able to remove the case to federal court by 'show[ing] to a legal cer-
tainty that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory mini-
mum[.]" 5
One court has stated the principle: "The process of determining the
amount in controversy is relatively straightforward: 'The question is not
what damages the plaintiff will recover, but what amount is "in contro-
versy" between the parties. That the plaintiff may fail in its proof, and
the judgment be less than the threshold (indeed, a good chance that the
plaintiff will fail and the judgment will be zero) does not prevent re-
moval. . . . Another has applied it thus: "[w]hen considering the
amount in controversy, the Court is to look to the face of the complaint
as those asserted allegations control the amount in controversy unless it
appears 'to a legal certainty the claim is really for less than the jurisdic-
tional amount."" 1 The amount in controversy is measured as of the date
of removal.' 8
The Third Circuit has summarized the law of amount in controversy
and found that there are "three main instructions" with respect to deter-
mining amount in controversy in the CAFA context:
member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state
and any defendant is a citizen of a state or (2) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a
citizen of a state and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign
state. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(B), (C).
13 Id. § 1332(d)(2).
14 Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2006).
is Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474 (quoting Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357
F.3d 392. 398 (3d Cir. 2004)).
16 Ldo, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1049 (quoting Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans. Inc., 427
F.3d 446, 448-49) (7th Cir. 2005).
'7 Morgan v. Gay, 2006 WL 2265302, at *4 (Aug. 7, 2006), af'd, 471 F.3d 469 (3d
Cir. 2006) (quoting Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961)); St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938); Clean Air Council v.
Dragon Int'l Group, 2006 WL 2136246, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2006).
'9 Clean Air Council, 2006 WL 2136246, at *3.
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I) The party wishing to establish subject matter jurisdiction has the
burden to prove to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy
exceeds the ,;tatutory threshold;
2) A plaintiff, if permitted by state laws, may limit her monetary
claims to ivoid the amount in controversy threshold; and
3) Even if a plaintiff states that her claims fall below the threshold,
this Court must look to see if the plaintiffs actual monetary de-
mands in the aggregate exceed the threshold, irrespective of whether
the plaintiff tates that the demands do not.' 9
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has examined the "standard of
proof' for establis hing the amount in controversy in those cases in which
the plaintiff has failed to plead a specific amount of damages. In such
instances, a defendant need not prove that the amount in controversy ex-
ceeds $5 million "with certainty." 2 0 Instead, where "the plaintiff has not
pled a specific amount of damages, the removing defendant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy ex-
ceeds the jurisdictional requirement." 21 In order to determine whether
this standard has been satisfied "a court first examines whether 'it is fa-
cially apparent from the complaint that the amount in controversy ex-
ceeds the jurisdiclional requirement."' 22 If the amount in controversy is
not facially apparent from the complaint, "the court should look to the
notice of removal and may require evidence relevant to the amount in
controversy at the time the case was removed."23
An additional issue regarding the amount in controversy is which
categories of damages should be considered in determining whether the
amount in controversy threshold has been met. At least one court has
held that punitive damages may be considered in determining the amount
in controversy.24 A few courts have held that attorney's fees may not be
included in an amount-in-controversy calculation.25
B. Exceptions to jurisdiction under CAFA.
N Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474-75 (citing Brill, 427 F.3d at 449; Samuel Bassett, 357
F.3d at 398).
21) Miedema v. Mayiag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1330 (1Ith Cir. 2006).
21 Id. at 1330 (quoting Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (1lth Cir.
2001)); see also Morgcn, 2006 WL 2265302, at *4 (holding that defendants must support
their assertions of fedeal subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence).
22 Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319).
22, Id. at 1330 (quoting Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319).
24 Ongstadv. Piper Jaffray & Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091 (D.N.D. 2006).
21 In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 436 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (D. Del.
2006); Berry v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 2006 WL 344774, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 15,
2006).
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Although CAFA's primary purpose is the expansion of federal di-
versity jurisdiction over class action lawsuits, that expansion is not abso-
lute. CAFA provides four mandatory exceptions to its grant of jurisdic-
tion and one discretionary exception. Each of these exceptions may re-
quire extensive discovery to determine removal or remand before the
court determines whether the proposed class should be certified.26
1. The "local controversy" exception.
The first mandatory exception is known as the "local controversy"
exception. It requires a federal district court to decline jurisdiction if:
(1) greater than two-thirds of the proposed class members are
citizens of the state in which the action was originally
filed;
(2) at least one defendant is a citizen of the state in which the
action was originally filed and is a defendant (a) from
whom "significant relief' is sought by members of the
class, and (b) whose alleged conduct forms a "significant
basis" for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff
class;
(3) "principal injuries" resulting from the alleged conduct of
each defendant were incurred in the State in which the ac-
tion was originally filed; and
(4) during the three-year period preceding the filing of that
class action, no other class action has been filed asserting
the same or similar factual allegations against any of the
defendants on behalf of the same putative class.27
The applicability of the local controversy exception tends to turn on
the issues of "significant relief' and/or "significant basis." CAFA is si-
lent as to the meaning of both terms. The Western District of Louisiana
has concluded that a determination of whether "significant relief' has
been requested from an in-state defendant must include "not only an as-
sessment of how many members of the class were harmed by the defen-
dant's actions, but also a comparison of the relief sought between all de-
fendants and each defendant's ability to pay a potential judgment., 28 The
Eastern District of Louisiana and the Eleventh Circuit have adopted this
standard and have each noted that a class seeks "significant relief' from a
defendant "when the relief sought against that defendant is a significant
portion of the entire relief sought by the class." 29
26 Suskin, 750 PLI/LIT 229 at 232.
27 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(A)
28 Robinson v. Cheetah Transp., 2006 WL 468820, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 27, 2006).
29 Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1167 (11th Cir. 2006); Gauntt v. Lou-
isiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2007 WL 128801, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 16, 2007);
Caruso v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2007 WL 64162, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2007).
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The Eastern District of Louisiana has also analyzed the issue of
"significant basis." The court noted that "the few courts that have ad-
dressed this provision in CAFA have evaluated whether a defendant's
conduct forms a 'significant basis' for plaintiffs' claims based on a com-
parison of the alleged role played by that defendant with that played by
the other defendants."3 o
Another court has identified three factors that it deemed "important
to a determination of whether the local controversy exception warrants
remand: (1) whther the product was sold outside of the locality; (2)
whether the injury incurred was specific to the locality; [and] (3) whether
the class as a whole seeks relief against the local defendant."3 These
factors build upon the foundation that the local controversy exception
was designed to permit state courts to continue to retain jurisdiction over
class action lawsuits that are-truly local in nature and effect.
2. The "hDme state controversy" exception.
The second mandatory exception is the "home state controversy"
exception, which requires a district court to decline jurisdiction over a
class action in which (1) two-thirds or more of the members of the plain-
tiff class and (2) the "primary defendants" are citizens of the state in
which the lawsuit was originally filed.32 All of the primary defendants
must be residents of the state in which the lawsuit is filed for the "home
state controversy" exception to apply.33
As with the local controversy exception, the home state exception
tends to hinge or. a term that is not defined by CAFA, specifically the
term "primary defendants." The Eastern District of Louisiana has exam-
ined the issue. "Clearly, CAFA intended there to be a substantive differ-
ence between 'prtmary defendants' and 'significant defendants' as con-
templated by the :wo exceptions to the exercise of jurisdiction under the
statute." 34 Left without guidance from CAFA, the Court turned to the
dictionary: "The dictionary definition of 'primary' includes 'first in im-
portance; chief; principal; main.' By contrast the dictionary definition of
'significant' includes 'important.' These definitions appear particularly
apt in the context of CAFA, meaning that a significant defendant is of
less importance than a primary defendant. Additionally, a significant de-
fendant is obviously one who is something more than 'insignificant,'
which is defined as 'having little or no importance' or 'trivial."' 35
.0 Caruso, 2007 WL 64162, at *3,
* Eakins v. Pella Corp., 455 F. Supp. 2d 450, 453 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
32 28 U.S.C.A. § I;32(d)(4)(B).
3 Robinson v. Cheetah Transp., 2006 WL 3322580, at *3 (W.D. La. Nov. 14, 2006).
34 Caruso, 2007 WL 64162, at *4.
3s Caruso, 2007 WL 64162, at *4 (citations omitted) (quoting WEBSTER's NEW
WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 739, 1140, 1334 (4th ed. 1999).
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3. The "state-action" exception.
The third mandatory exception is the "state-action" exception which
applies to all class actions in which the "primary defendants" are states,
state officials, or other governmental entities against whom the district
court may be foreclosed from ordering relief.36 The Fifth Circuit has held
that, reading the plain language of the statute, all of the primary defen-
dants must be states or other government entities in order for the "state-
action exception to apply.37
4. The "covered security" and corporate governance exceptions.
The fourth mandatory exception is really a category of related ex-
ceptions for certain claims based on securities and corporate governance.
CAFA does not apply to any class action that "solely" involves (1) a
claim "concerning a covered security," as defined by the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,38 (2) a claim "that re-
lates to the internal affairs or governance of a corporation or other form
of business enterprise and that arises under or by virtue of the laws of the
State in which such corporation or business enterprise is incorporated or
organized,"39 or (3) a claim "that relates to the rights, duties (including
fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to
any security" as defined by the Securities Act and associated regula-
tions.4 0 The term "security" under the third category is broader than the
term "covered security" under the first category and "encompasses secu-
rities that are not traded nationally or listed on a regulated national ex-
change."4'
These exceptions "carve out a substantial exception for state law
securities and business-related claims. This is the only category of claims
that CAFA exempts based on the specific subject-matter of the litiga-
tion."42 "The three subparagraphs of subdivision (d)(9), read together,
evince an overall legislative intention to maintain federal protection of
'the integrity and efficient operation' of the market for nationally traded
securities, while preserving the significant role played by states in the
regulation of business entities and securities that are not nationally
traded." 3
36 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(5).
3 Frazier v. Pioneer Americas LLC, 455 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2006).
38 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(9)(A).
3 Id. § 1332(d)(9)(B).
4o Id. § 1332(d)(9)(C).
41 Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 2006 WL 3524488, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2006).
42 Id. at *6.
43 Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
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The first excepted category of claims (the "covered security" excep-
tion) "exempts from CAFA those class actions solely involving claims
concerning securities which are traded nationally or listed on a regulated
national exchange."4 Those types of claims are, instead, governed by
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"), 45 which pre-
cludes both federal and state class actions asserting certain state-law
claims involving nationally traded securities. The effect of the "covered
security" exceptian "is to prevent CAFA from disturbing the impact of
SLUSA on state and federal law affecting nationally traded securities.46
One court hE.s determined that the "covered security" exception does
not depend on whether the plaintiff asserts claims against the issuer of
the securities or some other fiduciary: "[B]ecause Congress did not limit
the class of fiduciaries, the Court finds that the identity of the fiduciary is
irrelevant."47
The second category of excepted claims (the "internal affairs" ex-
ception) exempts class actions solely involving claims relating to the in-
ternal affairs or governance of a business entity and arising under state
laws applicable to that entity, "thus preserving the long-established rule
that the law of the state of incorporation normally determines issues re-
lating to the internal affairs of a corporation. The rule meets 'the need for
certainty and predictability of result while generally protecting the justi-
fied expectations of parties with interests in the corporation., 4 8
The third category of excepted claims (the "security exception")
'covers not only fights, duties and obligations conferred by the terms of
security itself, such as voting rights, but also those rights, duties and ob-
ligations that are connected with the security."49 Accordingly, claims
involving "decept:.ve acts and practices by misrepresenting and conceal-
ing the true nature of the investment" fall within the exception.5 0
5. The "interest of justice" exception.
The one discretionary exception is the highly subjective "interest of
justice" exception, which permits district courts to decline jurisdiction
"in the interests of justice and looking to the totality of circumstances."s'
" Id. at *6 n.9 (citations omitted).
45 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77 p; 78bb.
45 Estate ofPew, 2006 WL 3524488, at *6 n.9 (citations omitted).
4 Williams v. Texts Commerce Trust Co. of N.Y, 2006 WL 1696681, at *5 (W.D.
Mo. June 15, 2006).
411 Estate of Pew, :006 WL 3524488, at *6 n.10 (quoting First Nat. City Bank v.
Aanco Para El Comercio, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983)).
4' Estate ofPew, 2006 WL 3524488, at *5.
50 Id. at *5. One court has determined that the exception applies to claims related to
trust indentures. Williams, 2006 WL 1696681, at *5.
51 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3).
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This exception applies only to class actions in which more than one-third
but less than two-thirds of the members of the proposed class and the
"primary defendants" are citizens of the state in which the action was
originally filed. To evaluate whether the interests of justices and totality
of the circumstances dictate the exercise of jurisdiction over a particular
class action, district courts are to consider several factors:
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or in-
terstate interest;
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the
State in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of
other States;
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that
seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction;
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus
with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants;
(E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action
was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the ag-
gregate is substantially larger than the number of citizens from
any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the
proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of
States; and
(F) whether, during the three-year period preceding the filing of
that class action, one or more other class actions asserting the
same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons
have been filed.
As one commentator has noted, the discretionary nature of this ex-
ception will enable judges to employ it as a gatekeeping mechanism. 54
Further, "[i]nstead of applying bright line rules that typically govern ju-
risdictional decisions, now courts will be abe to make many subjective
determinations regarding, for example, whether claims involve matters of
national or interstate interest or whether the case has been pled to avoid
federal jurisdiction."ss In practice, this exception rarely has been liti-
gated. 56
V. CAFA Relaxes Restrictions on the Removal to Federal Court of
52 Id. § 1332(d)(3).
s3 Id. § 1332(d)(3).
5 Suskin, 750 PLI/LIT at 233.
s6 Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'I Med Ctr, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 583, 594
(E.D. La. 2006) (holding that the interests of justice required remand to Louisiana state
court); Berthelot v. BOH Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C., 2006 WL 2256995, at *5 (E.D. La.
July 19, 2006).
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Class Action Lawsuits.
Although the most important and most litigated aspect of CAFA is
its expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction, CAFA also relaxes and
simplifies the requirements for removal of class actions to federal district
courts. Generally, subject to certain exceptions, any civil action brought
in a state court cver which federal courts have original jurisdiction may
be removed within 30 days of the defendant receiving the pleading from
which it may be Jetermined that the case is removable.s5 CAFA, through
the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1453, liberalizes removal of class actions in
several respects.
First, CAFA. removes the one-year time limit under the general re-
moval statute ar d, instead, leaves open-ended the time within which
class actions can be removed under CAFA.18 Second, CAFA removes the
requirement that all defendants consent to removal and authorizes any
defendant to request removal without the consent of the other defen-
dants.59 Third, CAFA does not preclude removal of a class action merely
because a defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action was
filed.6 o
CAFA also fosters removal by expanding appellate review of re-
mand orders. O::dinarily, a remand order is not reviewable,62 but CAFA
authorizes remand orders in class actions to be immediately appealed,
subject to the court of appeals' agreement to accept the case.6 CAFA
also expedites the- appellate timetable for remand orders. An appellant
must .file its notice of appeal within seven days,6 and the court of ap-
peals must comp ete all action on the appeal, including rendering judg-
ment, within 60 Jays (unless either by agreement of the parties or for
good cause shown and in the interests of justice the court of appeals
grants itself an extension)." The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have all determined that 60-day time limit begins to
57 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441, et seq.
58 Id. § 1453(b).
* Id. § 1453(b); Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2006);
Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1329.
6o . 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(b).
6 The portions of CAFA pertaining to appellate review apply only to the review of
class actions brought .,nder CAFA and not to any other class actions. Saab v. Home De-
pot U.S.A., Inc., 469 F.3d 758, 759-60 (8th Cir. 2006); Patterson v. Morris, 448 F.3d 736,
742 (5th Cir. 2006); -Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697, 700
(5th Cir. 2006).
62 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d).
" Id. § 1453(c).
64 Id. § 1453(c)(1).
6s Id. § 1453(c)(2), (3).
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run at the time the order granting leave to appeal is entered, not the date
the petition for permission to appeal is initially filed.
VT. CAFA Establishes Guidelines to Protect Class Members, Includ-
ing a "Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights."
Another addition to the law of class actions introduced by CAFA is
its so-called "consumer class action bill of rights," which is a collection
of provisions designed to protect class members from settlements that
benefit the attorneys for the class while providing little or no benefit to
the class members. CAFA's "bill of rights":
(1) regulates "coupon settlements" (i.e., settlements in which the
class members receive coupons rather than or in addition to
monetary relief);67
(2) provides that a court may not approve a proposed settlement
that requires any class member to pay sums to class counsel
that would result in a net loss to the class member unless the
court makes a written finding that nonmonetary benefits to the
class member substantially outweigh the monetary loss;68
(3) prohibits judicial approval of a proposed settlement that pro-
vides greater awards to some class members on the basis that
the better-paid class members are located in closer geographic
proximity to the court; 69 and
(4) requires that specified state and federal officials be notified of
all proposed class action settlements.70
The provisions of the "bill of rights" that regulate coupon settle-
ments: (1) impose various restrictions on attorney's fees, (2) permit judi-
cial approval of coupon settlements only if the court finds that the set-
tlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members," and (3)
authorize courts to require a settlement agreement to provide for a por-
tion of the value of any unclaimed coupons to be donated to one or more
charitable or governmental organizations, as agreed to by the parties (al-
though this value cannot be included in the calculation of attorney's
fees).71
6 DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA ofN.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 2006); Hart
v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2006); Evans, 449 F.3d
at 1163-63; Patterson, 444 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2006); Amalgamated Transit Union
Local 1309, AFL-CIO, v. Laidlaw Transit Serv., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir.
2006).
67 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712.
68 Id. § 1713.
69 Id, § 1714.
70 Id. § 1715.
71 Id. § 1712.
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If a coupon settlement awards contingent attorney's fees, those fees
are based on the value to the class members of the redeemed coupons.72
Attorney's fees that are not contingent on the recovery of the coupons
(including fees attributable to obtaining equitable relief, such as injunc-
tions) are to be based on "the amount of time class counsel reasonably
expended working on the action."7 The court has discretion, upon a
party's motion, lo receive expert testimony regarding the actual value to
class members of the redeemed coupons.74
The notification provisions require notice to the appropriate state
official in each ;tate in which a class member resides, as well as to the
appropriate federal official, within 10 days of when a proposed settle-
ment of a class action is filed in court." Courts are not permitted to give
final approval tc a proposed settlement until 90 days after all officials
have been notified, and any class member may choose not to be bound
by a settlement agreement if that class member establishes that the re-
quired notifications were not provided.
VII. Additional Interpretation Issues
In addition to the provisions and issues discussed above, CAFA liti-
gation has involved a variety of other issues, created in many instances
by CAFA's silence on several topics.
A. Citizenship determined as of the date of filing.
In evaluating diversity under CAFA, the citizenship of proposed
class members is determined as of the date of filing of the complaint or
amended complaint, or, if the case started by the initial pleading is not
subject to federal jurisdiction, as of the date of service by the plaintiffs of
an amended pleadin , motion, or other paper, indicating the existence of
federal jurisdiction.7
CAFA refers to citizenship, rather than residency.79 "The Eleventh
Circuit has made clear that citizenship, not residency, is the focus of the
court's inquiry. 'An allegation of residence is insufficient to establish
diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff must allege citizenship."'so "A corpo-
72 Id. § 1712(a).
7 Id. § 1712(b)(1), (c).
74 Id. § 1712(d).
7 Id. § 1715(b).
76 Id. § 1715(d).
7 Id. § 1715(e).
78 Id. § 1332(d)(7)
'1 Id. § 1332(d)(2)'A).
IM Scott v. ING Clarion Partners, LLC, 2006 WL 3191184, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 31,
2006) (quoting Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Assoc., Inc., 624 F.2d 717, 719 (5th Cir.
1980).
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ration is 'deemed . .. a citizen of any State by which it has been incorpo-
rated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.'". An
unincorporated association is deemed to be a citizen of the state where it
has its principal place of business and the state under whose laws it is
organized.82
B. Commencement.
The most litigated issue related to CAFA is the question of when a
lawsuit has "commenced." CAFA provides that it "shall apply to any
civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act,"
which is February 18, 2005." The issue of when a lawsuit is "com-
menced" for purposes of removal under CAFA is governed by state law,
not federal law. Although, in most cases, it is fairly clear whether a
lawsuit has been commenced before or after February 18, 2005, there has
been considerable litigation over situations in which a lawsuit that was
filed prior to February 18, 2005, is amended after that date.
There is some disagreement as to whether a post-CAFA amendment
to a lawsuit that was filed prior to CAFA creates, in effect, a new com-
mencement of the lawsuit. The effect of the amendment to the lawsuit is
often important. For example, there is agreement that routine changes in
class definitions and claims allegations and the correction of scrivener's
errors do not constitute a new commencement.85 However, other catego-
ries of pleading amendments have proven more controversial.
The Tenth Circuit has investigated the courts' analyses of pleading
amendments and has identified three distinct views on the effect of post-
CAFA amendments on pre-CAFA lawsuits. The first view is "that a
'civil action' can 'commence' only once and, thus, [courts following this
view] take the absolute position that if an action was commenced prior to
81 Blockbuster, 472 F.3d at 59 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c)(1)); Lao, 455 F. Supp.
2d at 1061 (quoting Industrial Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th
Cir. 1990)).
82 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(10).
83 S. 5, 109th Cong. § 9.
8 See, e.g., Braud v. Transport Serv. Co. of Ill., 445 F.3d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 2006);
Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070, 1071-72 (8th Cir. 2006); Buller Trucking Co. v.
Owner Operator Ind. Driver Risk Retention Group, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775 (S.D.
111. 2006); Werner v. KPMG LLP, 415 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
85 Patterson, 448 F.3d at 739-40 (holding that, under Louisiana law, commencement
was unaffected by clerk's error that resulted in plaintiff filing additional filing fees after
CAFA's effective date for lawsuit filed prior to CAFA's effective date); Phillips v. Ford
Motor Co., 435 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that addition and substitution of
plaintiffs was "routine" and not a commencement); Bemis v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
2006 WL 1064067, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2006) (holding that addition of class repre-
sentative was not a commencement); Schillinger v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 425 F.3d 330,
333 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that scrivener's error could not create jurisdiction); Werner,
415 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
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CAFA's effective date, no post-CAFA amendment of the pleadings can
bring the Act into play."86 The second view with respect to post-CAFA
amendments, which was ultimately adopted by the Tenth Circuit, is that
"the relation-back analysis controls the commencement question for all
amendments, no distinction being made for amendments adding new de-
fendants."8 7 Thc third view, which is followed by the Fifth Circuit, holds
that "the relatioa-back analysis controls for all amendments except those
adding defendants, which are categorically treated as commencing a new
case as to the added defendants."
The first v:.ew appears to be the minority position, and most courts
hold that, at least in some circumstances, a post-CAFA amendment can
create a new commencement. The majority of courts "also generally
agree that whether an amendment is distinct enough to give rise to a new
commencement date is properly gauged by the forum state's law govern-
ing the relation-back of pleading amendments." 89 If the amendment "re-
lates back" to the filing date of the original complaint, "then the case is
not removable, but if it does not, the case is subject to removal under
CAFA."90
Regarding specific categories of amendments, some courts have
held that an amendment that enlarges the size of the class without adding
a new named party constitutes a new commencement,91 and some courts
have held that a. new commencement occurs when a plaintiff is added
who asserts claims that are different from the prior named plaintiff.92
86 Prime Care ojNortheast Kan., LLC v. Humana Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1284, 1285 (10th
Cir. 2006); see alsc Comes v. Mircosoft Corp., 403 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (S.D. Iowa
2005); Weekley v. Gvidant Corp., 392 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1067-68 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
87 Prime Care, 447 F.3d at 1286; see also Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1071-72.
88 Prime Care, 417 F.3d at 1286; Braud, 445 F.3d at 804-09.
89 Prime Care, 447 F.3d at 1286; Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. TMESYS, Inc., 432 F. Supp.
2d 1240, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2006) ("Whether an action has commenced in state court is
generally controlled by state law."); In re General Motors Corp. Dex-Cool Prods. Liab.
Litig., 2006 WL 2818773, *3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2006) ("In general courts apply the law
of the state where a class action was filed to determine whether an amendment of a class-
action complaint aftc r the effective date of CAFA has commenced the action for purposes
of removal under the statute."). However, some courts have suggested that the federal
relation-back rule ral her than the corresponding state rules should be used in determining
the effects of pleading amendments under CAFA. See Werner, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 701
("It is less clear whether state or federal law governs the 'relation back' analysis under
CAFA.").
9 Buller, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 772.
91 Senterfitt v. Svntrust Mortgage, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379-81 (S.D. Ga.
2005); see also Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315-17 (E.D.
Okla. 2005) (holding that amendment that transformed lawsuit from individual action to
class action constituted a new commencement).
92 Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2005 WL 1950244, at *3-5 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 15, 2005); Plummer, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
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However, other courts have held that amendments to class definitions
and the addition of new plaintiffs do not create a new commencement. 93
Courts likewise disagree as to whether an amendment that adds new
claims constitutes a new commencement.94 The Southern District of
Texas has examined the appellate cases examining the effect of pleading
amendments that add new claims and found that, while the courts have
differed in their outcomes, they "have used a consistent approach." 95
"When a pending suit is amended in state court to add a new claim,
courts look to relation-back rules as a way of analyzing whether the
amendment so changes the action as to commence a new action rather
than merely continue the previously-filed suit."96
Courts appear to agree that an amendment that adds a new defen-
dant creates a new commencement, at least as to the new defendant.97
The Fifth Circuit has held that a new lawsuit commences as to a new de-
fendant added after the effective date of CAFA, that the newly added
defendant may remove the entire lawsuit under CAFA, and that, if that
defendant chooses to remove the lawsuit, the plaintiff cannot defeat re-
moval and federal jurisdiction by subsequently dismissing the new de-
fendant.98 However, one district court has determined that in the context
of a "mass action" under CAFA, a newly added defendant can remove
only the portion of the lawsuit that relates to that defendant and cannot
remove the entire lawsuit. 99
Finally, several courts of appeals and district courts have examined
whether a defendant's removal, after the effective date of CAFA, of a
state court action that was pending prior to CAFA's effective date consti-
tuted the commencement of the action. The courts have rejected this no-
9 See, e.g., Schillinger, 425 F.3d at 334; Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 417 F.3d
748, 750 (7th Cir. 2005).
9 Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that
new claims constitute a new commencement); Moniz v. Bayer A. G., 447 F. Supp. 2d 31,
38 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that "a new claim arising out of the addition of a new prod-
uct . .. that was not previously part of the litigation" constituted a new commencement);
McAnaney v. Astoria Fin. Corp., 2005 WL 2857715, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2005)
(holding that new claim was not a commencement because claim "related back" to origi-
nal claim); Richina v. Maytag Corp., 2005 WL 2810100, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2005)
(holding that new claims did not constitute a commencement where they were substan-
tively similar to old claims).
9s Werner, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
9 Id.
9 Id. at 700; Robinson v. Holiday Universal, Inc., 2006 WL 470592, *2 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 23, 2006).
98 Braud, 445 F.3d at 804-09.
9 Lowery v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
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tion and held that "commencement" under CAFA refers to when the law-
suit is filed in stite court, not when it is removed. 00
C. Burden of proof.
Generally, defendants have the burden of establishing federal court
jurisdiction in tie removal context.101 Although CAFA is silent on the
burden of proof,"12 some courts have held that CAFA's dubious legisla-
tive history suggests that it has shifted the burden of proof to plaintiffs
(or the non-rem ving parties) to show that federal jurisdiction does not
exist.111 However, the majority of courts, including the Southern District
of Texas, have determined that CAFA's silence on the burden of proof
indicates that no change was intended and that defendants retain the bur-
den when a mot:on to remand is filed.'04 Similarly, there is disagreement
as to who bears the burden of proving the amount in controversy relative
to CAFA's $5 million threshold. 0 5
With respect to CAFA's exceptions to jurisdiction, the Fifth, Sev-
enth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that it is the burden of the plaintiff
(or the non-rem ving party) to prove that the "local controversy" and
"home state" ex.eption to CAFA applies. 06 However, at least one dis-
trict court has expressly rejected the holdings of these courts of appeals
and determined that the burden lies on the removing party to establish
that the exceptions do not apply.'0o One court, limiting its holding to
situations in which CAFA arises in a class action lawsuit that is origi-
nally filed in federal court (rather than state court), has held that the bur-
den of proof regarding the CAFA exceptions lies with "the party seeking
to avail itself of Ithe] exception."'o
i0 See, e.g., Bush v. Cheaptickets. Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005); Natale v.
Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 43, 44 (Ist Cir. 2005); Pritchett v. Office Depot. Inc., 420 F.3d
1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 2005); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lott, 417 F.3d 725, 726 (7th Cir. 2005).
' Abrego Abregc v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682-83 (9th Cir. 2006).
102 Werner, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
10 Bern' v. Amercan Express Publ'g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23 (C.D.
Cal. 2005).
1" See, e.g., Blockbuster, Inc., 472 F.3d at 57-58; Morgan, 471 F.3d at 473; Abrego,
443 F.3d at 682-85; Brill, 427 F.3d at 448; Werner, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 695: Gladvtone
Florist, LLC v. 77P, Inc., 2006 WL 3827518, at *I (W.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2006); Eufaula
Drugs, 2006 WL 986976, at *3.
los Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-91 (holding that removing party bears burden of
proving amount in co ntroversy); Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2005 WL 2083008, at
*2-3 (C.D. Cal. July I1, 2005) (holding that plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
damages sought do not exceed $5 million).
106 Hart, 457 F.3d at 680-81; Frazier, 455 F.3d at 546; Evans, 449 F.3d at 1165; see
also Gauntt, 2007 WL 128801, at *1.
107 Lao, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1055-60.
08 Mattera v. Clear Channel Comm., Inc., 239 F.R.D. 70, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Even where the plaintiff has the burden of proof, if the defendant
has the information necessary to establish whether federal jurisdiction is
appropriate, the district court may order the defendant to produce that
information to the plaintiff.'0o
D. Beware of legislative history.
One of the most controversial aspects of CAFA is the use, as an in-
terpretive tool, of a report on CAFA issued by 13 Senators on the Senate
Judiciary Committee 10 days after CAFA was enacted. Although this
report has been cited on several occasions by courts left with few other
sources with which to interpret CAFA's many gaps, undefined terms,
and confusing provisions, the report has been widely and harshly criti-
cized and is of highly questionable value.
There are three main criticisms of the report. First, the report was
issued 10 days after CAFA was enacted. "Given that the committee's
report was issued nearly two weeks after CAFA was enacted into law,
using the Senate Report's post-statutory enactment commentary arguably
runs afoul of the canon that legislative history unconnected to the enact-
ment of a specific statute is given little interpretative weight." 'o "The
fact that the committee report was issued after CAFA had already been
enacted into law should give pause as to whether the legislative history
truly reflects the views of the enacting Congress, or whether the issuance
of the report was meant to declare the intent of particular members, their
staff, or lobbyists seeking to achieve what they could not through pas-
sage of the statutory text itself.""'
The second criticism of the report is that it was authored by a "small
subset of the voting body of the Senate."" 2 As one court has noted, this
calls into question whether the report truly reflects the intent of Congress
or whether it amounts to little more than "after-the-fact bolstering or
'shaping' of CAFA." 3 Or, as the Ninth Circuit has stated, when search-
ing for a statement of legislative intent sufficient to support changes in
federal jurisdiction, "[a] declaration by 13 Senators will not serve." 4
The third criticism of the report is that, in many areas, it is less of an
interpretation of CAFA than it is an attempt to add provisions to the stat-
ute that were not contained in the statute that was actually enacted into
law. "The problem is that the report speaks to nothing in the statute itself;
1o9 Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem ' Med. Ctr, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 583, 592-93
(E.D. La. 2006).
110 Lao, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.
i' Id. at 1052.
112 Lowery, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1294.
" Id.
"4 Abrego, 443 F.3d at 685-86 (quoting Brill, 427 F.3d at 448).
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instead, the report seeks to fill in the gaps caused by the statute's silence
on the point. Such use of legislative history is ill-advised.""t5
As a result, courts have declared that the report's "probative value
for divining legislative intent is minimal,""' that it "has limited persua-
sive value,""'7 that it "is entitled to exceptionally little weight,"" 8 and
that reliance on the report would "ignore the Constitution's requirement
of bicameralism and presentment.""'9 Nonetheless, several courts have
continued to rely on the report to interpret CAFA's particularly mysteri-
ous provisions
E. The typographical error: "less" means "more."
Another bizarre aspect of CAFA is that it contains a surprising and
obvious typographical error. Regarding CAFA's provision for appealing
a remand order, CAFA staites that a court of appeals may accept an ap-
peal from an order denying a motion to remand if it is made "not less
than seven days" after entry of the remand order." 20 Clearly, Congress
was attempting to set a seven day limit within which such appeals must
be sought and meant "more" when it wrote "less." The courts have
agreed that the statute was erroneously written and that the provision
should be read to mean "not more than seven days."' 2'
The Eleventh Circuit explained the reason that the statute should be
read as it was apparently intended to read (i.e., "not more than seven
days"), rather than as written:
We now raffirm that construction of § 1453(c)(1), for to read it lit-
erally would produce an absurd result: there would be a front-end
waiting period (an application filed 6 days after entry of a remand
order would be premature), but there would be no back-end limit (an
application filed 600 days after entry of a remand order would not
be untimely). When applying the plain and ordinary meaning of
statutory language "produces a result that is not just unwise but is
clearly absurd, another principle comes into the picture. That princi-
ple is the venerable one that statutory language should not be ap-
plied literally if doing so would produce an absurd result." 22
' Lao, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.
116 Blockbuster, 472 F.3d at 58.
1" Lowery, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1294.
1' Abrego, 443 F.3d at 687.
119 Blockbuster, 472 F.3d at 58.
120 28 U.S.C.A. 5 1453(c)(1) (emphasis added).
121 Morgan, 46( F.3d at 277; Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, 435 F.3d at
1146; Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1326 (11th Cir. 2006); Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1093 n.2.
12 Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181,
1188 (11th Cir. 1997).
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F. "Mass actions" are class actions ... sometimes.
Another confusing aspect of CAFA are its references to "mass ac-
tions." With some exceptions, a class action under CAFA also includes
"mass actions" in which the monetary claims of 100 or more persons are
to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve com-
mon questions of law or fact, even if the action is not certified as a class
action. 123 However, a mass action is not subject to CAFA if:
(1) all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence
in the state in which the action was filed, and the event or oc-
currence allegedly resulted in injuries in that state or in states
contiguous to that state;
(2) the claims are joined upon the motion of a defendant;
(3) all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the gen-
eral public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or mem-
bers of a purported class) pursuant to a state statute specifically
authorizing such an action; or
(4) the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for
pretrial proceedings. 124
Mass actions differ from true class actions in that federal subject
matter jurisdiction over mass actions extends only to those individual
claims that meet the general jurisdictional amount in controversy re-
quirement of $75,000 mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 125 Further,
where a mass action has been removed to federal court, CAFA requires:
(1) the action cannot subsequently be transferred to any other court via
the federal multidistrict litigation statute1 2 6 unless a majority of the plain-
tiffs request the transfer; and (2) the limitations periods governing claims
asserted in the action are tolled during the period in which the action is
pending in federal court.127 There has been little examination of "mass
actions" by the courts.128
VIII. Conclusion
In light of the passage of CAFA, it is likely that most class actions
involving oil and gas will be litigated in federal court. The intent of
CAFA was to expand federal subject matter jurisdiction over class action
lawsuits and, with some exceptions, take class actions out of state courts
and place them in federal courts. Although CAFA appears to be success-
123 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d)(l l)(A), (B)(i).
124 Id. § 1332(d)(I 1)(B)(ii).
125 Id. § 1332(d)(I 1)(B)(i).
126 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407.
121 Id. §§ 1332(d)(I 1)(C), (D).
128 The Northern District of Alabama has applied the mass action provisions of CAFA.
See Lowery, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288.
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ful in doing just that, its effectiveness has been hampered by Congress'
poor drafting of the statute, including large gaps, undefined terms, and
confusing provisions. That CAFA is an important statutory scheme
loaded with issues of interpretation guarantees significant litigation over
its applicability.
Jq;S~?0;)- CRCQCQCQ
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